Teaching Cases: How Legal Writing Textbooks Approach the Rule Support Section

See infra Parts I.B–I.D.

The application section is sometimes called the “analysis,” and the conclusion is often referred to as the “thesis.” However, these terminology variations are very limited compared to the lengthy list of possible terms to describe the rule support section. See infra notes 124–142 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.

Alissa Bauer, One Tort, Four IRACs, and Five Lessons about Rule Support Cases, 30 Persps. 75, 75 (2023). I prefer the terms “rule support case” or “rule support section” over the multitude of other names used for this section. I like this terminology because, as I conceptualize it, this section “supports” but does not usurp the role of the rule section. I also appreciate that the term allows professors and law students to talk about both the rule support “section” as a whole as well as one or more specific rule support “cases” in that section using the same terminology. In other words, the term “rule support” can be applied to the whole section (the “rule support section”) as well as its parts (the “rule support cases”).

Id.

Id. at 75, 77, 85.

As a general approach, I will use the first-person singular pronoun in this Article when I am describing the methodology of this empirical analysis. To be clear, I did not do all the work for the empirical study by myself, and I am incredibly appreciative of the invaluable assistance that I received. Loreen Peritz helped to identify the full universe of legal writing textbooks that we considered including in this Article and then helped to rank the popularity of those textbooks. Also, Jeanette Subkhanberdina completed the initial review and coding for three textbooks, and Caroline Tsai did the same for one textbook. I subsequently reviewed and revised Jeanette and Caroline’s initial coding. Although I did not complete this study on my own, it is confusing to switch between first-person singular and first-person plural when relevant to distinguish between when only I worked on a part of the study and when a combination of Loreen, Jeanette, Caroline, and I worked on a part of the study. Therefore, as the sole author of this Article, I will use the first-person singular.

The IRAC acronym stands for issue, rule, application, conclusion. See Heidi K. Brown, The Mindful Legal Writer: Mastering Predictive and Persuasive Writing 6 (2016). The CRAC structure is similar but starts with the conclusion, not the issue. See Charles R. Calleros & Kimberly Y.W. Holst, Legal Method and Writing 286 (9th ed. 2022). It is sometimes written C-RAC. See Alexa Z. Chew & Katie Rose Guest Pryal, The Complete Legal Writer 39 (2d ed. 2020). TRAC is an alternative acronym for the same basic structure, but the T stands for the thesis. See Helene S. Shapo, Marilyn R. Walter & Elizabeth Fajans, Writing and Analysis in the Law 121 (7th ed. 2018). An additional variation is CiRAC, where the “Ci” reminds writers that the “conclusion is a thesis that should be stated in terms of the issue.” See John C. Dernbach, Richard V. Singleton II, Cathleen S. Wharton & Catherine J. Wasson, A Practical Guide to Legal Writing and Legal Method 219–20 (7th ed. 2021). CLA(W) is another alternative for the same structure, but the L means the law and the W represents “[w]rap up if necessary.” See Chew & Pryal, supra, at 40. Other options include BaRAC (where Ba means “bold assertion”), CRARC (where the second R means “rebuttal and refutation”), IRAAC(P) (where both As show that the writer must discuss “all sides” of the analysis and P means policy), and IRRAC (where the second R refers to the reasoning supporting the rules). See Tracy Turner, Finding Consensus in Legal Writing Discourse Regarding Organizational Structure: A Review and Analysis of the Use of IRAC and Its Progenies, 9 Legal Commc’n & Rhetoric 351, 357–58 (2012) (citation omitted). None of these variations include a letter to represent the rule support section.

Maria Termini, Proving the Point: Connections Between Legal and Mathematical Reasoning, 52 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 5, 8 (2019).

Alternatively, the IREAC acronym stands for issue, rule, rule explanation, application, conclusion. See Brown, supra note 8, at 6. The CREAC structure is the same, but it starts with the conclusion, not the issue. See id. IREXAC and CREXAC are alternative acronyms in which the EX replaces the E. See Turner, supra note 8, at 357–58; Mary Beth Beazley & Monte Smith, Legal Writing for Legal Readers: Predictive Writing for First-Year Students 128 (3d ed. 2022). In addition, TREAT is another acronym for the same basic structure, but the T stands for the thesis or thesis heading. See Michael D. Murray & Christy H. DeSanctis, Legal Writing and Analysis 22 (3d ed. 2021). A very similar option is TREAC. See Turner, supra note 8, at 358. CRuPAC is another variation, where the Ru stands for the rule and the P is the proof of rule. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Ellie Margolis & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Legal Reasoning and Legal Writing 117 (9th ed. 2021). Also, CRRPAP is a different acronym that includes rule proof and ends with prediction. See Christine Coughlin, Joan Malmud Rocklin & Sandy Patrick, A Lawyer Writes: A Practical Guide to Legal Analysis 95 (3d ed. 2018). Another option is IGPAC, where G means general rule and P means precedent. See Barbara Blumenfeld, Why IRAC Should Be IGPAC, 10 Second Draft, Nov. 1995, at 3. Finally, an additional acronym is RAFADC, where A means authorities, which includes authorities that “help factually illustrate the scope of the rule,” F means facts from the fact pattern, and AD means “analogize and distinguish.” See Sam Jacobson, RAFADC, Not IRAC, 10 Second Draft, Nov. 1995, at 9. Although these variations of the legal writing paradigm do include a letter for the rule support section, they do not consistently name (or letter) that section.

Termini, supra note 9, at 12; Diane B. Kraft, CREAC in the Real World, 63 Clev. St. L. Rev. 567, 567 (2015); Tracy Turner, Flexible IRAC: A Best Practices Guide, 20 Legal Writing 233, 233 (2015); Turner, supra note 8, at 352.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Berenguer, Lucy Jewel & Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Gut Renovations: Using Critical and Comparative Rhetoric to Remodel How the Law Addresses Privilege and Power, 23 Harv. Latinx 205, 216 (2020) (stopping short of “arguing that IRAC should be shelved” but proposing that “we should and must critique the inegalitarian and racist roots of traditional legal rhetoric and strive to infuse it—and sometimes replace it—with alternative rhetorical practices”); Laura P. Graham, Why-Rac? Revisiting the Traditional Paradigm for Writing About Legal Analysis, 63 U. Kan. L. Rev. 681, 682 (2015) (asserting that the IRAC paradigm should be used “only to illustrate the basic framework for conducting legal analysis, instead of presenting it as a template for writing that students should rigidly follow”); George D. Gopen, The Golden Pen Award: IRAC, REA, Where We Are Now, and Where We Should Be Going in the Teaching of Legal Writing, 17 Legal Writing xvii, xix (2011) (arguing that the IRAC paradigm “can breed a false sense of security in students” and can lead professors to “de-emphasize or perhaps ignore completely the most fundamental and essential skills of writing”); Soma R. Kedia, Redirecting the Scope of First-Year Writing Courses: Toward a New Paradigm of Teaching Legal Writing, 87 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 147, 150–51 (2010) (asserting that the IRAC structure is an “imprecise organizational tool” that “does not explicitly teach students to formulate legal analysis”); Christine M. Venter, Analyze This: Using Taxonomies to “Scaffold” Students’ Legal Thinking and Writing Skills, 57 Mercer L. Rev. 621, 624 (2006) (arguing that the IRAC paradigm is “too formulaic and too limited to allow for analytical skills to fully develop”).

Turner, supra note 11, at 236; Kraft, supra note 11, at 572; Susie Salmon, IRAC: Still the Best Organizational Solution, 50 Ariz. Att’y, Jan. 2014, at 10; see also Andrew J. Turner, Let’s Not Be Creative: “Rigid IRAC” and the Hidden Power of Formalistic Legal Writing, 72 J. Legal Educ. 283, 284, 296–97 (2024) (asserting that the IRAC structure is a “standard operating procedure” that helps legal writers to avoid their natural narrative style while producing better legal writing).

Charles Calleros, IRAC: Tentative and Flexible and Therefore Reliable, 10 Second Draft, Nov. 1995, at 4. But see Turner, supra note 13, at 299–301 (arguing that making the IRAC paradigm more flexible “will ultimately undermine its effectiveness without fixing any of the other problems incorrectly attributed to it” and noting that the process of legal research and analysis can and should be flexible while the written end product should not).

Kraft, supra note 11, at 568, 570; Salmon, supra note 13, at 10; Termini, supra note 9, at 14; Turner, supra note 8, at 356.

Kraft, supra note 11, at 568–69; Salmon, supra note 13, at 10; Termini, supra note 9, at 14; Turner, supra note 8, at 356.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 137; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 86; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 37; Kraft, supra note 11, at 569; Laurel Currie Oates, Anne M. Enquist & Jeremy Francis, The Legal Writing Handbook: Analysis, Research, and Writing 301 (8th ed. 2021); Termini, supra note 9, at 14; Turner, supra note 11, at 233.

Kedia, supra note 12, at 159; Kraft, supra note 11, at 569; Salmon, supra note 13, at 10; Turner, supra note 8, at 356; Turner, supra note 11, at 233.

See Kraft, supra note 11, at 572 (noting that the IRAC paradigm “capture[s] the essence of what is involved in legal analysis: applying legal principles to facts (the R and the A parts)”) (citation omitted).

Brian N. Larson, Endogenous and Dangerous, 22 Nev. L.J. 739, 755 (2022) [hereinafter Larson, Endogenous and Dangerous]; see also Brian N. Larson, Law’s Enterprise: Argumentation Schemes & Legal Analogy, 87 U. Cin. L. Rev. 663, 698 (2019) [hereinafter Larson, Law’s Enterprise]. Larson also points out a series of “critical questions” or “defeater” arguments raised by this argument scheme, including (1) whether the “legal authority J actually say[s] that legal category A applies in every instance with features ƒ₁ . . . ƒ_n”; (2) whether the “instant case ha[s] features ƒ₁ . . . ƒ_n”; (3) whether “legal authority J ha[s] authority over the persons or things in the instant case”; (4) whether “legal authority J govern[s] the law applicable in the instant case”; (5) whether “any legal authority identified an exception to the rule in the presence of features g₁ . . . g_n—features present here”; (6) whether “there [is] any previous similar case where the rule was not applied”; and (7) whether “the policy underlying the rule suggest[s] that an exception to the rule should exist in the presence of features g₁ . . . g_n—features present here.” Larson, Endogenous and Dangerous, supra, at 756; see also Larson, Law’s Enterprise, supra, at 699.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 128 (comparing CRAC and CREXAC); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 164–65 (comparing IRAC and TREAT terminology).

I will also use the term “IRAC” to encapsulate all the various iterations of the legal writing paradigm, including variations like CRAC, CREAC, and TREAT, which begin with the conclusion or thesis.

See supra note 8.

See Termini, supra note 9, at 14.

Turner, supra note 8, at 354–55.

Id. at 357–58.

Id. at 359.

Id.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 136 (“formula of issues and sub-issues that you identify as necessary to answer the questions that your case presents”); Brown, supra note 8, at 95 (“exact legal question you will answer”) Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 91 (“a question that a judge, jury, agency hearing officer, arbitrator, or other adjudicator must resolve to determine the outcome of a legal dispute”); Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 65 (“a point in dispute that needs to be resolved by legal analysis”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 93 (statement of the “legal issue”); Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 28 (“the legal question that must be resolved before a case can be decided”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 11 (“[a]n individual legal question implicated by a problem (a set of facts) that needs to be answered”); Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 99 (“the points you must discuss to analyze a claim”).

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 138 (describing the “conclusion-thesis” as the issue stated as a conclusion); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 93 (describing the conclusion as the “initial conclusion” about the “legal issue”); Linda H. Edwards & Samantha A. Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis 89 (6th ed. 2023) [hereinafter Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis] (describing the conclusion as “your conclusion about the issue”); Linda H. Edwards & Samantha A. Moppett, Legal Writing: Process, Analysis, and Organization 82 n.7 (8th ed. 2022) [hereinafter Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization] (describing the conclusion as “your answer to the issue”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 22 (describing the “thesis heading” as “the answer to the issue”); Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 117 (describing the conclusion as the “one you are trying to prove”); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Sheila Simon & Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, Legal Writing 137 (5th ed. 2023) (describing the conclusion as “your determination of how the law treats certain facts” and “what you are trying to prove”).

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 139 (“the rule that governs the issue”); Brown, supra note 8, at 95 (“applicable rule derived from a statute, regulation, and/or common law”); Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 89 (“the legal [r]ule that will help resolve the issue”); Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 41 (“the law you use in your analysis”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 93 (“[a]n explanation of the law”); Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 185 (“description of the law” that “provide[s] your reader with the essential legal rules or principles on which your discussion is based”); Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 89 (“the applicable rule of law”); Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 21 (“statement that explains the test for deciding a legal issue”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 12 (“statement of the legal principles and requirements that govern the analysis of the legal issue at hand”); Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 117 (“principal rule on which you rely in reaching your conclusion”); Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137 (“the primary [rule] on which you rely in reaching your conclusion”); Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 121 (“applicable rule of law”); Nancy L. Schultz & Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Legal Writing and Other Lawyering Skills 47 (6th ed. 2014) (“all legal authority, or general rules, applicable to your case”); Robin Wellford Slocum & Gina Nerger, Legal Reasoning, Writing, and Other Lawyering Skills 145 (4th ed. 2022) (“the rule of law upon which your entire analysis will rest”).

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 144 (“apply the rule to the facts”); Brown, supra note 8, at 98 (“appl[y] each part of the applicable legal rule to the client’s fact pattern”); Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 89 (“[a]pply the rule to the relevant facts”); Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 41 (“match law to your facts to draw a legal conclusion”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 93 (apply “the law to the client’s facts” to “explain why a particular outcome is likely”); Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 219 (explain “how those rules apply to a particular set of facts”); Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 90 (“[a]pply the rule to your client’s facts”); Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 80 (“[e]xplain how the rule applies to your client’s facts”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 22 (“apply[] the rules to the facts of the present situation”); Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 118 (“demonstrate[e] that the rule + the facts = your conclusion”); Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137 (apply the “rule’s test” to “your facts”); Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 47 (“[a]pply this legal authority to the facts of your particular case”); Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 121 (“[a]pply the law to the facts of your case and compare to the precedents”); Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 146 (“[a]pply the law to the client’s factual situation”).

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 137 (state “impact” that the “application ha[s] on a court’s decision in this case”); Brown, supra note 8, at 98 (“conclud[e] and predict[] the ultimate outcome”); Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 89 (“[r]each a [c]onclusion on the question of whether the facts satisfy the legal rule”); Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 41 (“succinctly state[] what happens when you apply the law to your facts”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 93 (state a “final conclusion”); Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 219 (“end by re-stating the conclusion”); Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 90 (“[r]estate your conclusion”); Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 79 (answer “the question you were asked”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 165 (“conclu[de] on the issue”); Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 117 (“sum up by restating your conclusion”); Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137 (same); Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 47 (“[d]raw a conclusion based on the legal authority that you have applied to your case”); Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 121 (“conclude on the issue”); Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 149 (“[r]estate the answer” to the issue).

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 139–44; Brown, supra note 8, at 107–112, 355–58; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 96–113; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 350–57, 359–62; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 99–112, 354–57; Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 73–88, 185–200, 222–24; Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 79–88, 91–92; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 21–73, 241–51; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 12–20, 40–49, 51–60, 71–117, 174–86; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 9–16, 18–19; Neumann et al., Legal Writing, supra note 30, at 140–41; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 124–26, 130–39; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 89–107, 185–92, 367–75, 378–82, 401–02. Some of these textbooks discuss the rule support section as a part of their explanation and description of the rule section. See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 142; Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 191–92.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 144–45, 181–90; Brown, supra note 8, at 143–52, 372–77; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 113–16; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 362–63, 376–77; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 141–77; Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 203–12, 224–31; Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 101–08, 122–27; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 95–105, 263–69, 285–87; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 156–61, 193–201; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 17–18; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 139–42, 146; Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 50–51; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 126–27; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 160–68, 243–48, 289–90, 326–29, 387–89, 398–401, 403.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 138; Brown, supra note 8, at 105–07, 352–54, 429–30; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 91–96; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 339–40; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 11–12.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 145–46; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 116–17; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 357–58, 364–67; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 179–84; Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 220–22; Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 90–91; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 201–03; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 128; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 169, 289–90.

Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 Legal Stud. F. 7, 9 (1996).

Id.

See id. at 10; see also Brian N. Larson, Precedent as Rational Persuasion, 25 Legal Writing 135, 192 (2021) (explaining that the “pattern of legal analogy” posits that if a “previous case had similar facts and came out a certain way[,] this case should thus come out the same way”); Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and Experience, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 251–52 (2017) (explaining that “the legal reasoner perceives a relevant similarity between the situation involved in some previous decision and the situation at issue in the instant case, and then uses the analogy between the previous decision and the instant case to argue that the instant case ought to be decided in the same way as the previous one”).

See Edwards, supra note 38, at 10.

Larson, Law’s Enterprise, supra note 20, at 664.

Edwards, supra note 38, at 10; see also Jennifer M. Cooper, The Science of Legal Synthesis, 95 St. John’s L. Rev. 285, 290 (2021) (explaining that analogical reasoning “compare[s] and contrast[s] individual features of examples to predict a result based on similarities and differences” and “reason[s] that because a current situation is similar to a past situation, the current situation should result in the same outcome”); Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 102: Create a Portal for Story Immersion, 18 Legal Commc’n & Rhetoric 27, 53 (2021) (explaining that in analogical reasoning, “lawyers compare critical facts that lead to a legal ruling that the lawyer wishes to liken to or distinguish from their client’s situation”).

Larson, Endogenous and Dangerous, supra note 20, at 760; see also Larson, Law’s Enterprise, supra note 20, at 702. Larson also points out a series of “critical questions” or “defeater” arguments raised by this argument scheme, including (1) whether the “circumstances of this argument permit application of legal analogy from a cited case”; (2) whether all of the features of ƒ₁ . . . ƒ_n are “present in the cited case and the instant case”; (3) whether the “cited case really assign[ed] legal category A”; (4) whether the features of ƒ₁ . . . ƒ_n are “relevant to legal category A”; (5) whether there are “dissimilarities [of] g₁ . . . g_n between the cited case and instant case that are relevant to legal category A”; (6) whether “there [is] some other case that is also similar to [the] instant case in that both have features ƒ₁ . . . ƒ_n, except that legal category A is not applied in that case”; (7) whether “the cited case [is] binding on the court in the instant case”; (8) if the case is not mandatory authority, whether “there [is] cause to decide the case differently in this jurisdiction”; and (9) whether the “cited case [was] wrongly decided.” Larson, supra note 20, Endogenous and Dangerous, at 761; see also Larson, Law’s Enterprise, supra note 20, at 703.

Mary Beth Beazley, Desirable! Fire, Flood, Famine & IRAC?, 10 Second Draft, Nov. 1995, at 2.

Larson, Law’s Enterprise, supra note 20, at 664.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 184–88; Brown, supra note 8, at 148–49, 374; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 153–54; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 50–55; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 147–61; Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 116–17; Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 56–57, 122–25; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 14; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 24–27; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 95; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 80–82; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 198; Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 300; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 55, 228–29; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 127, 358–59; see also Kedia, supra note 12, at 168 (noting that the “main mode of legal reasoning taught in legal writing textbooks is the use of analogy and distinction in analyzing case precedent and the use of rules and rule explanations on which to premise the application”).

See, e.g., Schauer & Spellman, supra note 40, at 257 (explaining the critics’ argument that the “announcement of an alleged antecedent similarity between the source (the first case or the first set of facts) and the target (the instant case or set of facts) disguises the fact that the similarity is a policy-based judgment and not a raw fact about the world”); Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 517, 524 (1998) (rejecting the propositions that judges are able to “grasp what is ‘like’ and ‘unlike’ what” and that “this ability is infallible”); Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 353, 371 (1997) (explaining that an “analogy is a way of stating a conclusion, not a way of reaching one, and theory must do the real work”); Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 57, 81 (1996) (describing analogical reasoning as “the method for finding the legal principles that ‘justify’ the morally unjustified”); Peter Westen, On “Confusing Ideas”: A Reply, 91 Yale L. J. 1153, 1163 (1982) (noting that analogical reasoning requires formulating a legal rule to explain the legally-relevant similarities before identifying those similarities).

Schauer & Spellman, supra note 40, at 249.

Id.

Id.; see also Cooper, supra note 43, at 290 (noting that despite criticism, analogical reasoning “remains central to legal thought”); Larson, Law’s Enterprise, supra note 20, at 664 (noting that analogical reasoning has a “‘special prominence’” in the law); Larson, supra note 40, at 192 (noting that analogical reasoning is “conventional in law, though it is not in all fields”).

Schauer & Spellman, supra note 40, at 264–65, 268.

Id. at 265.

See id.

Bauer, supra note 4, at 75.

Edwards, supra note 38, at 10.

Id. at 10–11 (describing policy-based reasoning as “reasoning [that] identifies criteria for law creation by asking which result would best encourage desirable results and discourage undesirable results beyond the bounds of the present dispute”; consensual normative reasoning as reasoning that “supports law-making that is consistent with customary and generally recognized practices”; and narrative reasoning as reasoning that “evaluates a litigant’s story against cultural narratives and the moral values and themes these narratives encode”).

Bauer, supra note 4, at 75; see also Blumenfeld, supra note 10, at 3 (explaining that the failure to include rule support cases “leaves [students] without any precedent to which they can analogize the facts of their own case”).

Bauer, supra note 4, at 75, 77, 85; see also Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 122 (explaining that, in “most instances,” the rule support section is “necessary to show how the rule functions”).

Bauer, supra note 4, at 75.

Id.

Id.

See Kraft, supra note 11, at 570 (noting that the “rule explanation provides the basis for the reader to accept the writer’s application of the rule to the facts”).

See Robbins, supra note 43, at 53 (explaining that the “illustration” of a rule support case is able to “create narrative transportation in just a few words”).

Bauer, supra note 4, at 75.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

See Larson, supra note 40, at 139 (noting that “the practices of judges and advocates” should “represent their normative preferences—and thus the practical norms of legal reasoning”).

See id. at 135, 141, 192–94.

Id.

Id. at 139.

Id. at 160–61. These decisions addressed copyright fair use and were issued between January 1, 2012, and December 31, 2018. Id. at 161. For each of those decisions, Larson collected the moving party’s relevant original motion or motions as well as the non-moving party’s relevant opposition papers, but he did not collect any additional reply briefs. Id.

Id. (noting that he only coded and analyzed the portion of those documents that dealt with fair use).

Id. at 165.

Id. at 165, 168–69.

Id. at 169–70. Alternatively, Larson coded a case as “RULE” if the lawyer or judge used the case to support a rule that was stated in the text or “GENERALIZATION” if the writer cited that case to make a generalization about how courts often or usually approach a specific question. Id. at 169. Also, Larson coded a case as “POLICY” if the lawyer or judge used the case to support an underlying policy and as “QUOTATION” if the writer cited the case as the source of a quotation. Id.

Id. at 170. If the case did not fit into any of these five categories (or even if it did), Larson coded the case as “OTHER USE” and noted what that use was if the case was used for an additional purpose beyond these five purposes. Id.

Id. at 141.

Id. at 141, 173–74, 194.

Id. at 141, 175–76, 194.

Id. at 177–78, 196. Prevailing attorneys also used cases for other purposes, such as for quotations and for policy, more frequently than non-prevailing attorneys used them. Id. at 177.

Id. at 177, 196. This correlation, however, does not prove causation. Id. at 178.

See Shaun B. Spencer, Using Empirical Methods to Study Legal Writing, 20 Legal Writing 141, 150 (2015); see also id. at 179 (noting that when analyzing legal writing, a study must extract data from documents, which may encompass the “legal writing itself”).

See id. at 181 (describing “manual document review and coding” as one way to conduct empirical research to study legal writing).

Contra Kristen E. Murray & Jessica Lynn Wherry, The Legal Writing Companion: Problems, Solutions, and Samples xix (2d ed. 2019) (contrasting the book’s purpose with legal writing textbooks that address the “basics of legal writing”).

Contra Christopher D. Soper & Cristina D. Lockwood, Successful Legal Analysis and Writing: The Fundamentals v (5th ed. 2022) (contrasting the book’s “basic component approach to legal writing” with a “comprehensive” approach).

Compare Beazley & Smith, supra note 10 (addressing only predictive legal writing) with Brown, supra note 8 (addressing both predictive and persuasive legal writing).

Originally, I only limited the search to textbooks whose latest edition was published between 2000 and 2023. Within this broad time frame, I found that the latest editions of the vast majority of the textbooks I was considering were published after 2014, and most were published even more recently than that. Also, the textbooks that were published earlier included textbooks from the early to middle 2000s with only a first edition. See, e.g., Michael D. Murray & Christy H. DeSanctis, Legal Research and Writing (2005); Cathy Glaser, Jethro Lieberman, Robert Ruescher & Lynn Su, The Lawyer’s Craft: An Introduction to Analysis, Writing, Research, and Advocacy (2002). But see Veda R. Charrow, Myra K. Erhardt & Robert P. Charrow, Clear and Effective Legal Writing (5th ed. 2013) (fifth edition published in 2013). Therefore, I decided not to include the few textbooks that were published before 2014 in the final data set.

For two of the textbooks, a new edition was released after I closed the data set and analyzed the content of the selected textbooks. See Christine Coughlin, Joan Malmud Rocklin & Sandy Patrick, A Lawyer Writes: A Practical Guide to Legal Analysis (4th ed. 2024); Elizabeth Fajans, Joy Kanwar & Helene S. Shapo, Writing and Analysis in the Law (8th ed. 2024). Because of the timing, I was unable to include these editions in my analysis.

I decided not to include open-source legal writing textbooks. See, e.g., Jean Mangan, Legal Writing Manual, https://alg.manifoldapp.org/projects/legal-writing-manual (3d ed.) (last visited Aug. 8, 2024); Ben Hernandez, Legal Writing I & II: Legal Research and Writing & Introduction to Litigation Practice, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4293995 (Jan. 12, 2023). SSRN indicates that, as of August 7, 2024, Legal Writing I & II: Legal Research and Writing & Introduction to Litigation Practice has been downloaded 2,117 times and its abstract has been viewed 4,026 times. However, there is no way to compare these figures to the number of libraries that own a copy of each legal writing textbook according to WorldCat, which is my proxy for textbook popularity in this empirical analysis. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. Also, there is no information on OpenALG’s website to indicate how many times Legal Writing Manual has been downloaded, making it impossible to compare the popularity of this electronic textbook to the print textbooks that I included in this empirical analysis.

Contra Alexa Z. Chew, The Fraternity of Legal Style, 20 Legal Commc’n & Rhetoric 39, 44, 45 (2023) (collecting and analyzing 19 legal “style books written for lawyers” that can “be read from beginning to end” as opposed to “textbooks written for law students” after reviewing 100 potential books for inclusion in the data set).

Id. at 45.

WorldCat.org puts the world’s libraries at people’s fingertips, OCLC, https://www.oclc.org/en/news/releases/2022/20220824-worldcatorg-puts-libraries-at-peoples-fingertips.html (last visited May 14, 2024).

I looked at aspenpublishing.com, cap-press.com, and westacademic.com.

See Chew, supra note 94, at 44–47.

Id. at 45 n.49.

See id. at 45–46 (using WorldCat library holdings as a “reasonable proxy for each book’s popularity”). I considered only using the last two editions of each textbook in my analysis to avoid favoring textbooks that had multiple editions and therefore were held in the collections of more libraries. However, this narrow focus tended to distort the number because libraries do not always buy the most recent edition of a textbook when textbooks tend not to change significantly across editions.

Using this criterion, I excluded nine legal writing textbooks. See Jill Barton & Rachel H. Smith, The Handbook for the New Legal Writer (3d ed. 2023) (held in 82 libraries); Daniel L. Barnett & Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Legal Reasoning and Objective Writing: A Comprehensive Approach (2016) (held in 52 libraries); Mary-Beth Moylan & Stephanie J. Thompson, Legal Writing and Global Lawyering Skills (3d ed. 2023) (held in 10 libraries); Ruth Anne Robbins, Steve Johansen & Ken Chestek, Your Client’s Story: Persuasive Legal Writing (2d ed. 2018) (held in 25 libraries); Deborah A. Schmedemann & Christina L. Kunz, Synthesis: Legal Reading, Reasoning, and Communication (5th ed. 2017) (held in 42 libraries); Danielle M. Shelton, Karen L. Wallace & Melissa H. Weresh, Legal Analysis and Writing: An Active-Learning Approach (2020) (held in 38 libraries); Ann M. Sinsheimer, Teresa Kissane Brostoff & Nancy M. Burkoff, Legal Writing: A Contemporary Approach (2d ed. 2018) (held in 63 libraries); Tracy Turner, Legal Writing from the Ground Up: Process, Principles, and Possibilities (4th ed. 2015) (held in 42 libraries); Kristen Konrad Tiscione, Legal Writing: From Advice to Advocacy, A Contemporary Approach (2021) (held in 14 libraries).

See supra note 47. Although the rule support section is required to set up the analogical reasoning in the application section, the analogical reasoning itself happens in the application section, not the rule support section. Therefore, I did not focus any specific research questions on how first-year legal writing textbooks describe analogical reasoning because this subject falls outside the scope of the rule support section.

For each textbook, I also recorded the title; the author or authors; the latest edition; and the year that the latest edition was published. I have on file a master document with all the data.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 6, 75–77, 93 n.1, 93–101, 105, 113–16, 118–23, 125–27, 140–43, 146, 148–51, 153–56, 161–62, 164–67, 194, 202–03, 223, 240, 266, 276, 278, 280, 330, 332, 344, 346, 351, 358–75, 390, 397, 399, 406–07, 409–11, 415–16, 419, 426–29, 435, 437–39, 442–43, 456, 464, 526, 528; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 93–95, 113–32, 136, 173, 266–67, 324, 338, 367, 380, 386–87, 393–95, 402, 404, 408; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 9, 30, 53–54, 104, 117–23, 134–38, 169–75, 185–213, 223, 237–38, 240, 245–47, 249, 251, 253, 271–73, 278, 351–53, 357–62, 384, 386, 397, 491–93, 497–505, 510–11, 579–80, 585, 593, 611, 614, 655, 671, 739, 879.

See, e.g., Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 188–92, 219, 222–23, 293–96; Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 48, 50, 70, 144, 249, 255, 301, 323, 328.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 6, 75–77, 93 n.1, 93–101, 105, 113–16, 118–23, 125–27, 140–43, 146, 148–51, 153–56, 161–62, 164–67, 194, 202–03, 223, 240, 266, 276, 278, 280, 330, 332, 344, 346, 351, 358–75, 390, 397, 399, 406–07, 409–11, 415–16, 419, 426–29, 435, 437–39, 442–43, 456, 464, 526, 528; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 93–95, 113–32, 136, 173, 266–67, 324, 338, 367, 380, 386–87, 393–95, 402, 404, 408; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 9, 30, 53–54, 104, 117–23, 134–38, 169–75, 185–213, 223, 237–38, 240, 245–47, 249, 251, 253, 271–73, 278, 351–53, 357–62, 384, 386, 397, 491–93, 497–505, 510–11, 579–80, 585, 593, 611, 614, 655, 671, 739, 879.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 6, 75–77, 93 n.1, 93–101, 105, 113–16, 118–23, 125–27, 140–43, 146, 148–51, 153–56, 161–62, 164–67, 194, 202–03, 223, 240, 266, 276, 278, 280, 330, 332, 344, 346, 351, 358–75, 390, 397, 399, 406–07, 409–11, 415–16, 419, 426–29, 435, 437–39, 442–43, 456, 464, 526, 528.

See id.

See id.

See, e.g., Oates et al., supra note 17, at 9, 30, 53–54, 104, 117–23, 134–38, 169–75, 185–213, 223, 237–38, 240, 245–47, 249, 251, 253, 271–73, 278, 351–53, 357–62, 384, 386, 397, 491–93, 497–505, 510–11, 579–80, 585, 593, 611, 614, 655, 671, 739, 879.

Id. at 9.

Id. at 30, 53–54, 104, 117–23, 134–38, 169–75, 185–213, 223, 237–38, 240, 245–47, 249, 251, 253, 271–73, 278, 351–53, 357–62, 384, 386, 397, 491–93, 497–505, 510–11, 579–80, 585, 593, 611, 614, 655, 671, 739, 879. In addition, in A Lawyer Writes, Christine Coughlin, Joan Malmud Rocklin, and Sandy Patrick discuss the rule support section and cases in detail and answer all the questions on the list of topics for which I was coding. See Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 93–95, 113–32, 136, 173, 266–67, 324, 338, 367, 380, 386–87, 393–95, 402, 404, 408. The authors introduce the concept of the rule support section in their description of the legal framework for a legal argument and then expand on the concept in a section called “Explaining the Law: Case Illustrations.” Id. at 93–95, 113–32. The textbook then discusses the rule support section again in the chapters, sections, and appendices related to plagiarism, counteranalysis, editing, professional emails, persuasive writing, and annotated examples. See id. at 136, 173, 266–67, 324, 338, 367, 380, 386–87, 393–95, 402, 404, 408.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 151–80 (“Using Cases in the Rule Explanation”); Brown, supra note 8, at 113–27 (“Rule Explanation: Explaining and Illustrating a Legal Rule Through Case Law”); Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 369–77 (“Illustrate Rules”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 113–32 (“Explaining the Law: Case Illustrations”); Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 89–99 (“Small-Scale Organization: Explaining the Law”); Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 77–93 (“Analyzing a Single Issue: Rule Explanation”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 119–61 (“Analysis of Multiple Authorities: Explanatory Synthesis”); Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 125–33 (“Varying the Depth of Rule Proof and Rule Application”); Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 145–51 (“Varying the Sequence and Depth of Rule Explanation and Rule Application”).

See Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 48, 50, 70, 144, 249, 255, 301, 323, 328.

Id. at 48 (noting that “[a]lmost all approaches to legal analysis use some form of what we teach you here—identify your issue and rule, apply the rule to your case, and state your conclusion”); see also id. at 50 (labeling the rule support section in an example IRAC as simply the “Major Premise: (Relevant legal authority or rule)”).

Id. at 48, 50, 70, 144, 249, 255, 301, 323, 328.

Id. at 70. Because this statement is included between “[i]dentify the key facts of your case” and “[c]ompare the facts of those cases with the facts of your case,” it is unclear if the authors are considering these rule support elements to be a part of the rule section of the IRAC paradigm. See id.; see also id. at 301 (noting that “[u]nless you are citing a case only for a general legal proposition, be certain that you provide the reader with the relevant facts, the court’s holding, and its rationale”).

See id. at 84, 145–46, 151–52, 228, 302.

See id.

Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 222–23 (noting that the “‘R’ in your organizational structure” for common law problems includes the “general rule and then describe[s] cases relevant to your conclusion that apply the rule”).

Id.

See id. at 188–92, 219, 222–23, 293–94.

Unlike the rule support section, the issue, rule, application, and conclusion sections of the IRAC are generally referred to the same way. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 9, 46, 48, 128, 134–35, 140–44, 146, 150–52, 154, 164, 169, 172–75, 178, 181–82, 186, 188–89, 232, 233, 238, 240–42, 251, 259, 284–85 (always); Brown, supra note 8, at 6, 93 n.1, 93–101, 105, 113–16, 118–23, 125–27, 140–43, 146, 148, 150, 153–56, 161–62, 164–67, 194, 202–03, 223, 240, 266, 276, 278, 280, 330, 332, 344, 346, 351, 358–67, 369–75, 390, 397, 399, 406–07, 409–11, 415–16, 419, 426–29, 435, 437–39, 442–43, 456, 526, 528 (mostly); Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 89–90, 92–93, 95–97, 99, 101–02, 105, 109, 113–15, 119, 132, 140, 197–98, 213 (mostly); Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 77, 77 n.1, 79 n.6, 79–81, 83–84, 88, 90–91, 103, 108, 111–12, 116, 118–20, 257–59, 263, 293 (mostly but twice said just “explanation”); Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137–41, 145–47, 150–51, 154, 159–60, 162, 208, 212, 257, 267, 290, 311 (always); Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 141, 146–47, 149, 153–54, 169, 170, 172, 193–203, 241–42, 247, 289, 290–91, 318, 325, 328, 385–86, 392, 403, 549, 550 (always).

Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 145, 173 n.8, 286, 302 n.7 (twice said “rule explanation” while citing to another text and twice said “explanation or proof of the rule”); Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 40 (twice said “[r]ule [e]planation” and once said “[e]xplain the rule”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 94 (once said “explanation of rule”); Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 219 n.1 (once); Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 117, 173, 174, 179 (sometimes); Oates et al., supra note 17, at 209 (once said “[e]xplanation of the rules”).

Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 360–61, 369–77, 429, 465, 478 (“rule illustration”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 7, 87–88, 90, 91, 95, 99, 100, 113–32, 136, 153, 176–77, 261, 266–67, 281, 295, 324, 326, 338, 357–59, 380, 386–87, 393–95, 404, 411 (“case illustration”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 22, 29, 30, 116, 119–21, 123–25, 133–34, 136–39, 144, 145–60, 165–68, 183–84, 186–89, 193–201, 203, 209–10, 217, 247, 253–54, 261, 265, 267, 275, 354–57, 369, 382, 389 (“explanation section”); Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 117–18, 120–21, 125–28, 136, 143–47, 265–66, 278, 364, 406 (“rule proof,” “proof of rule,” and “rule proof and explanation”); Oates et al., supra note 17, at 9, 30, 53–54, 104, 117–19, 122, 134, 136–38, 169–70, 173, 185–86, 191–93, 195, 198–99, 202–04, 206–07, 209–10, 223, 238, 240, 245–47, 249, 251, 253, 271–73, 278, 351–53, 357–58, 361–62, 384, 397, 491–93, 497, 499, 503–05, 510–11, 579–80, 585, 593, 611, 614, 655, 671, 739, 879, 932 (“analogous case”); Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 121–22, 125, 131–32, 135–37, 139, 172, 179, 228–29, 357–58, 406, 415–16, 418 (“precedent”).

See Brown, supra note 8, at 265.

See Brown, supra note 8, at 96 n.1, 113 n.1, 360; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 402.

See Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 185, 189–92, 219, 293–94 (generally using the term “explanation” but not as a term of art to describe the rule support section); Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 48, 50, 70, 144, 249, 255, 301, 323, 328 (not using specific terminology to name or describe the rule support section when discussing the rule support section or concepts related to the rule support section).

See Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 48, 50, 70, 144, 249, 255, 301, 323, 328; see also Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 185, 189–92, 219, 219 n.1, 293–94 (using the term “explanation” once when describing the CREAC structure generally but not as a term of art to describe the rule support section).

Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 50.

See id. at 84, 145–46, 151–52, 228, 302. Of note, the authors do not include a rule support step in the IRAC structure when they first introduce the legal writing paradigm. See id. at 48.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 9, 46, 48, 128, 134–35, 140–44, 146, 150–52, 154, 164, 169, 172–75, 178, 181–82, 186, 188–89, 232, 233, 238, 240–42, 251, 259, 284–85 (“rule explanation”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 22, 29, 30, 116, 119–21, 123–25, 133–34, 136–39, 144, 145–60, 165–68, 183–84, 186–89, 193–201, 203, 209–10, 217, 247, 253–54, 261, 265, 267, 275, 354–57, 369, 382, 389 (“explanation section”); Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137–41, 145–47, 150–51, 154, 159–60, 162, 208, 212, 257, 267, 290, 311 (“rule explanation”); Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 141, 146–47, 149, 153–54, 169–70, 172, 193–203, 241–42, 247, 289–91, 318, 325, 328, 385–86, 392, 403, 549–50 (“rule explanation”).

See, e.g., Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 40, 360–61, 369–77, 429, 465, 478 (using “rule illustration” but mentioning “rule explanation” and “case illustration”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 7, 87–88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 99, 100, 113–32, 136, 153, 176–77, 261, 266–67, 281, 295, 324, 326, 338, 357–59, 380, 386–87, 393–95, 402, 404, 411 (mostly using “case illustration” but mentioning “case explanation,” “explanation of rule,” and “rule proof”); Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 89–90, 92–93, 95–97, 99, 101–02, 105, 109, 113–15, 119, 132, 140, 197, 198, 213 (using “rule explanation” but mentioning “rule proof” and “case illustration” as components of rule explanation); Oates et al., supra note 17, at 9, 30, 53–54, 104, 117–19, 122, 134, 136–38, 169–70, 173, 185–86, 191–93, 195, 198–99, 202–04, 206–07, 209–10, 223, 238, 240, 245–47, 249, 251, 253, 271–73, 278, 351–53, 357–58, 361–62, 384, 397, 491–93, 497, 499, 503–05, 510–11, 579–80, 585, 593, 611, 614, 655, 671, 739, 879, 932 (using “analogous case” but mentioning “[e]xplanation of the rules”); Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 121–22, 125, 131–32, 135–39, 172, 179–80, 228–29, 357–58, 406, 415–16, 418 (using “precedent” but mentioning “cases”).

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 6, 75–77, 93 n.1, 96 n.1, 93–101, 105, 113 n.1, 113–16, 118–23, 125–27, 140–43, 146, 148–51, 153–56, 161–62, 164–67, 194, 202–03, 223, 240, 265–66, 276, 278, 280, 330, 332, 344, 346, 351, 358–75, 390, 397, 399, 406–07, 409–11, 415–16, 419, 426–29, 435, 437–39, 442–43, 456, 464, 526, 528 (using “rule explanation,” “precedent case,” “case illustration,” “case explanation,” and “case example”); Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 145, 151–53, 173 n.8, 183, 186–87, 194, 196, 231–33, 254–59, 286, 291–93, 302 n.7, 416, 493 (using “rule proof and explanation,” “rule explanation,” “explanation or proof of the rule,” “rule illustration,” “[p]recedent,” “[s]pecific case analysis,” “[i]n-depth analysis of case law,” “[i]n-depth case analysis,” “[c]ase analysis,” “[i]n-depth analysis,” “[i]n-depth analysis of favorable case law,” and “[i]n-depth analysis of adverse case law”); Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 77 n.1, 77, 79 n.6, 79–81, 83, 84, 88, 90–91, 95–96, 100–01, 103–04, 107–08, 111–12, 116, 118–20, 257–259, 263–64, 268, 293 (using “rule explanation,” “explanation section,” and “explanation”); Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 117–18, 120–21, 125–28, 136, 143–47, 173–74, 179, 265–66, 278, 364, 406 (using “rule proof and explanation,” “rule proof,” “proof of rule,” and “rule explanation”).

See, e.g., Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 151–53.

See, e.g., id. at 183, 187, 194, 196, 231–33, 254–59, 291–93, 416.

See id. at 186.

See id. at 145, 173 n.8, 286, 302 n.7.

Id. at 231.

Id.

Id.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 9; Brown, supra note 8, at 94, 97; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 110; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 369; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 95; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 165; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 53; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 121.

See, e.g., Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 92, 119; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 118; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137.

See, e.g., Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 89; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 79, 257.

See Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 219, 222–23.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 9 (description of “how the relevant rule has been applied in other similar cases”); Brown, supra note 8, at 94, 97 (“expla[nation] or illustrat[ion of] the rule through case examples” that “illustrate how prior courts have applied the same rule in either similar or different factual situations”); Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 110 (“illustrations of the rule, explaining how each applied the rule to specific facts”); Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 369 (“description of a court opinion that applied your rule of general applicability to facts that are similar to your facts”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 95 (“expla[nation of] how the rules . . . were applied to cases that are factually similar to the client’s case”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 165 (“[e]xpla[nation] and illustrat[ion of] how the rule works in actual, prior situations, thus providing greater clarity and context for the conclusion and predictions of the memorandum”); Oates et al., supra note 17, at 53 (“illustrat[ion of] how the courts have applied a particular rule” by showing the “types of situations in which the courts have held that a particular element of a statute or common law rule was met or not met”); Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 121 (“[e]xamin[ation of] how the rule is applied in the relevant precedents”); Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 147 (“analysis of how earlier cases have interpreted and applied the rule of law”); see also Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 70 (although the authors do not define the rule support section, a legal analysis checklist notes that “any good legal analysis must contain” a variety of information, including the “facts, holdings, and rationales of all important relevant cases”). But see Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 147 (“in the case of a statutory rule of law, [the rule support section] may also include statutory interpretation and an examination of legislative history”).

Brown, supra note 8, at 113.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 151.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 96–97; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 151; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 95, 113; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 120.

Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 113; see also id. at 95 (noting that “case illustrations explain how the rules . . . were applied to cases that are factually similar to the client’s case”).

Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 120; see also id. at 120–25 (containing a lengthy chart comparing the rule section with the rule support section).

Id. at 120; see also Brown, supra note 8, at 96–97 (“after you communicate the rule to the reader,” the writer uses the rule support section “to illustrate how prior courts have applied the same rule in either similar or different factual situations”); Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 151 (“[a]fter stating your synthesized rule, you normally will illustrate it with case summaries that illustrate how the courts have applied the rule in previous cases, presumably in the cases from which you derived your rule”).

Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 92, 119; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 118; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137.

Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 92.

Id. at 119.

Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137.

Id.

Id. The rule support definition is contrasted with the rule, which is defined as the “primary” or “main” rule “on which your analysis rests.” Id; see also Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 118 (noting that rule support “is a demonstration that the main rule on which you rely really is the law in the jurisdiction involved,” which “can be done through citations to authority, such as statutes and precedent, together with explanations of how that authority stands for the rule as you have stated it, explanations of policy, and counter-analyses”).

Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 79; see also id. at 257 (reiterating that the rule explanation in the persuasive context includes (1) the conclusion, (2) the “most favorable” rule, and (3) an explanation of “what the rule means” and “us[ing] cases to illustrate it”). Interestingly, in Legal Writing and Analysis, Edwards and Moppett use the term “rule explanation” to describe the rule support section as its own distinct sub-part of the CRAC paradigm and more broadly to cover the entire first half of CRAC paradigm. Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 89 (showing the CRAC paradigm with the rule explanation section including (1) the conclusion, (2) the rule, and (3) the rule explanation).

Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 79. But see id. at 88 (labeling a sample draft as all rule explanation but, within the section, separately labeling the issue, the rule, and the rule explanation).

See Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 90; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 138, 139.

Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 90.

Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 139; see also id. at 159 (noting that “[f]or each issue or sub-issue, sort everything you have into two categories: rule [support] and rule application”); Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 88 (instructing writers to avoid “includ[ing] rule application in the rule [support] section” and suggesting that writers, “[a]s a discipline, draw a line between rule [support] and rule application on your working draft, to remind yourself to keep your discussion of your client’s facts below the line”) (emphasis in original).

Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 222–23; see also id. at 219 (describing the CiRAC organizational structure as the conclusion followed by a “description of the relevant rule or rules and an explanation of how those rules apply to a particular set of facts” and completed with a re-stated conclusion). Although the practical impact of this conceptualization is probably not different than the impact of the textbooks’ conceptualization of the rule support section as including both the narrow definition of the rule support section plus at least part if not all of the rule part of the IRAC paradigm, it is a different theoretical approach.

Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 166, 177; see also Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 141 (“the best way to explain the meaning of a phrase-that-pays is by illustrating how it has been applied in one or more authority cases”); Brown, supra note 8, at 98 (the goal “is to paint a vivid picture of how a court applied the legal rule to the facts in the precedent case”); Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 152 (“[b]y explaining the reasoning and factual basis for a judicial decision, the illustration provides the reader with a deeper understanding of the law than could be conveyed by a simple verbal rule statement”); Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 369 (rule support cases “help your readers understand your law better” and “help bring your rule of general applicability into alignment with your facts so that you can apply the law to your facts and draw a conclusion”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 114 (“[c]oncrete details from a prior case help your reader visualize how the general legal principle described in the rule functions in real life”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 125 (the goal “is to explain how the rules should be interpreted and applied based on how the authorities have applied them in actual, concrete factual settings”); Oates et al., supra note 17, at 186 (“include analogous case descriptions because the case descriptions will help the attorney understand the rules”); Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 125 (the rule support section “connect[s] the case discussion to that rule” and “[s]how[s] how the precedent illustrates, limits, expands, or explains the law”).

Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 151; see also Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 123 (noting that rule support cases “establish ‘parameters of behavior’ by creating a spectrum of behavior within which a client’s conduct falls” with “one end of the spectrum . . . establish[ing] conduct that did meet the standard” and “the other end of the spectrum . . . establish[ing] conduct that did not meet the standard”).

Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 138; accord Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 119 (the purpose is to “prove and explain the rule because the reader will refuse to follow you further until you’ve established that the rule is what you say it is and until you’ve educated the reader somewhat on how the rule works”).

Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 140–41.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 153; Brown, supra note 8, at 97–98, 114–22, 125; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 151; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 369, 374; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 115; Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 192, 223; Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 99; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 113; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 187; Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 70; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 154–56; see also Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 123 (noting that a rule support case setting up “case-to-case analogical reasoning” is a “paragraph devoted to explaining the facts, law, and application of the law to the facts of a single, very relevant, very important authority”). Of note, Murray and DeSanctis advocate that this structure of “case-to-case analogical reasoning” is not their preferred approach to the rule support section. Id. at 126. Rather, they advocate that legal writers should use an “explanatory synthesis” structure instead. Id. For this approach, the structure starts with a “proposition about how the law works” followed by a string of case cites, each with its own explanatory parenthetical showing how that case “illustrates the proposition about how the law works.” Id. at 123, 126–28; see also infra notes 225–233 and accompanying text.

Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 119.

Id.; see also Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 162 (explaining that it is “permissible to omit” the court’s reasoning when the “argument turns on a question of fact”).

Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 119.

See Brown, supra note 8, at 114–15; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 157.

See Brown, supra note 8, at 121 n.7 (noting that “[s]ome legal writing professors and lawyers prefer to flip the order of the holding and rationale—placing the rationale before the holding”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 120.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 143; Brown, supra note 8, at 115; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 152, 254; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 369, 374; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 116; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 191; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 125; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 154.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 143; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 125; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 154. Interestingly, in The Mindful Legal Writer: Mastering Predictive and Persuasive Writing, Brown suggests starting the first rule support paragraph with a “rule statement.” Brown, supra note 8, at 97, 114–15. Brown explains that a writer introduces the first rule support case “by stating the legal rule” that the writer “plan[s] to illustrate via the case.” Id. at 115. Brown acknowledges that, if this rule support case is the first time in the body of the document that the writer is “identifying the governing rule,” this rule statement “could comprise the main R in your overall IREAC or CREAC.” Id. However, as an alternative, a writer “may decide to describe the overall rule first in [the] overview/umbrella/roadmap paragraph” and subsequently “transition” to the first rule support case with “a subrule, or narrower version of the main rule, that will be further illustrated via that case.” Id. This rule “might be extracted from a statute or a single case, or it might be synthesized from a group of cases.” Id. Brown’s “rule statement” sentence therefore sometimes functions as part of the rule section of the IRAC paradigm, see supra notes 154–159 and accompanying text (describing the broader definition of the rule support section, including part or all of the rule section), and sometimes functions as a thesis sentence.

Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 116.

Id. at 120.

Id.

Id.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 153.

Id.

Id. at 154.

See Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 188; Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 92–93; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 79, 82–84, 87–88, 260–63; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 118; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137; see also Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 172–73 (instructing legal writers to consider including counteranalysis in the rule support section, as well as the application section, despite having a narrow conceptualization of the rule support section).

Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 79.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 143–44; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 111.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 143.

Id.

Id.

Id. at 144.

Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 111 (emphasis in original).

Id.

Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 369–70; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 121–22.

Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 122.

Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 370–72.

Id. at 370–71; accord Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 122 (noting that if the rule is “ambiguous,” a writer may need to include a rule support section).

Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 370–71.

Id. at 370.

Id. at 371.

Id. at 370, 372.

Id.

Id. at 372.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 142 (suggesting that a writer “describe at least one case in which the court found that the case met the standard of the phrase-that-pays and at least one case in which the court found that the case did not meet the standard of the phrase-that-pays”); Brown, supra note 8, at 166 (suggesting including cases with “interesting facts that are similar or analogous to the client’s case” as well “cases that show opposite sides of the spectrum of a rule”); Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 152 (explaining that the reader’s “depth of understanding increases” when the rule support cases “reach different conclusions”); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 126 (instructing writers to include cases that are both “good” and “bad” for the client); Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 192 (advising writers to include cases with “facts most analogous to or distinguishable from your facts”); Oates et al., supra note 17, at 53 (noting that lawyers “select cases that illustrate the types of situations in which the courts have held that the element was met and cases that illustrate the types of situations in which the courts have held that the element was not met”).

Brown, supra note 8, at 166; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 126–27; Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 191–92; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 54.

Brown, supra note 8, at 156.

Id. at 166.

Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 126.

Oates et al., supra note 17, at 186.

Brown, supra note 8, at 108, 360.

Oates et al., supra note 17, at 186; Brown, supra note 8, at 166.

Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 152; Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 191.

Brown, supra note 8, at 371 (providing three examples of potential rule support section structures, including three to four rule support cases in each in addition to one to two explanatory parentheticals); Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 110 (advising a writer to include “cases with the most similar facts (maybe one to three)” and “any cases that are unlike your client’s facts (maybe one or two)”); Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 155 (suggesting that a writer include no more than “three or four” rule support cases in a “case-by-case presentation[]” rule support section). Murray and DeSanctis advocate for an “explanatory synthesis” structure over a “case-by-case presentation” structure for the rule support section. See infra notes 242–244 and accompanying text. Using that model, the authors suggest trying to include “four or five separate cases in the string cite for each synthesis.” Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 124.

Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 129; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 110. Of note, Edwards and Moppett discuss this organizational advice as part of a much larger discussion of how to organize a very broadly defined rule support section, most of which is not applicable to how to order a narrower conceptualization of the rule support section. See Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 108–14.

Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 110; see also Brown, supra note 8, at 371 (showing different organizational schemes for organizing the rule support section and including similar rule support cases first followed by contrasting rule support cases).

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 140–42; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 231–33; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 121; Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 190–91; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 114; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 120, 125–27; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 146; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 194; Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 301.

Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 120; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 146; see also Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 301 (noting that sometimes a rule support case requires only a sentence or a parenthetical and sometimes it requires a paragraph).

Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 120; see also Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 146.

Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 233.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 141–42; Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 191.

Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 191; see also Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 141.

Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 191; see also Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 162; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 194.

Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 146.

Id.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 158; Brown, supra note 8, at 119, 202, 362–63; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 374; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 130–31.

Brown, supra note 8, at 119; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 131, 266.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 167; Brown, supra note 8, at 123, 202, 362–63; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 132.

Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 131, 177.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 166; Brown, supra note 8, at 120, 122, 125, 362.

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 155–56; Brown, supra note 8, at 121.

Brown, supra note 8, at 121, 124, 362; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 118.

Brown, supra note 8, at 121, 362.

Id. at 121–22.

Brown, supra note 8, at 162, 361–62; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 375, 429.

Brown, supra note 8, at 162, 365, 397.

Brown, supra note 8, at 122, 203, 362; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 402.

Brown, supra note 8, at 122–24, 203, 362–63; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 402.

Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 261.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 167–68; Brown, supra note 8, at 140–41, 166, 202–03, 359, 365, 367, 369; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 233; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 384; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 428; Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 94–95; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 113; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 125–28, 132–33, 139, 141–43, 149, 151, 153–54, 189–92; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 174; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 195; Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 304; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 359.

See Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 167–69; Brown, supra note 8, at 140–41, 156, 166, 367, 369; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 233; Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 95; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 113; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 141–43, 152–53, 192; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 174; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 359; Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 304.

See Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 168; Brown, supra note 8, at 140, 167, 203, 365–68; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 125–28, 132–33, 139, 141–43, 149, 151, 153–54, 189–92.

Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 123, 189; see also id. at 137 (describing “case-to-case analogical reasoning” as the “[b]ack-[u]p [m]ethod”).

Id. at 123 (showing example explanatory synthesis format as: “Proposition about how the law works. Case 1 (parenthetical showing how Case 1 illustrates the proposition about how the law works); Case 2 (parenthetical showing how Case 2 illustrates the same proposition); Case 3 (parenthetical showing how Case 3 illustrates the same proposition); Case 4 (parenthetical showing how Case 4 illustrates the same proposition); and so on”) (italics removed)); see also id. at 126–28, 190.

Id. at 143, 192.

See, e.g., Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 324; Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 145–46; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 131; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 389; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 173–74; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 212; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 271–73, 278.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 137, 140–44, 151–80, 232–33, 238, 240–41; Brown, supra note 8, at 93–101, 113–26, 140–42, 154–56, 161–62, 165–67, 202–03, 223, 526, 528; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 90, 134, 151–53, 172, 231–33, 254–55; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 77, 79–91, 103, 107–14, 116, 118–20; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 217, 247–48, 253–54, 259, 261, 265–67, 275; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137–41, 146, 151, 154, 160, 162; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 134–35, 138, 169–70, 173–75, 185–87, 223, 237–38, 240, 245, 249, 251, 253; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 166, 172; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 137–38, 141, 154–59, 169–70, 172–73, 194–200, 241–42.

See, e.g., Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 289, 293–94 (discussing how to address rule support cases for a “summary-of-the-law memorandum,” described as a “shorter summary of the relevant law when a full, written analysis of how the law applies to the facts of a particular case is not needed”); Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 289–92.

See, e.g., Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 179–80.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 284; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 493; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 294–95; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 369; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 208; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 318, 322–23, 325–26, 328.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 285–86.

See, e.g., Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 382.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 137, 140–44, 151–80, 232–33, 238, 240–41; Brown, supra note 8, at 93–101, 113–26, 140–42, 154–56, 161–62, 165–67, 202–03, 223, 526, 528; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 77, 79–91, 107–14, 116, 118–20; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137–41, 146, 154, 159–60, 162; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 137–38, 141, 154–59, 169–70, 172–73, 194–200, 241–42.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 46; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 369.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 240, 330; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 231; Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 197–98, 213; Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 257–60; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 264–67, 271, 278; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 257, 267; Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 385–86, 392–98, 403.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 265–66, 276–81.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 344, 346, 351, 358–71, 397, 399, 406–07, 409–11, 415–16, 419; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 357; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 351–53, 357–58, 361–62, 374, 384, 397; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 357–59.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 332.

See, e.g., id. at 333–34.

See, e.g., id. at 336–37.

See, e.g., id. at 340.

See, e.g., id. at 427–29, 435, 437–39, 442–43.

See, e.g., id. at 456; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 294; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 290–91; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 491–93, 497, 499–505, 510; Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 301; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 406, 415–16, 418, 435.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 464; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 317; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 311; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 579–80; Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 323, 328.

To be clear, I am not advocating that every legal writing professor take the same approach to the rule support section that I take. I have my preferred terminology and conceptualization based on my experience and pedagogical approach, and I want to teach that to my students. I would not want to be told to change my approach to conform to another professor’s preferences.

Cf. Kanet Chotvorrarak, Tawepong Arayapisit, Lalida Matthayomnan, Panupong Thampibul & Piyada Gaewkhiew, Exploring the Ambiguity in the Anatomical Terminology Among Dental Professionals, 24:904 BMC Medical Education, 2024, at 3, https://rdcu.be/ecb1g (last visited Mar. 5, 2025) (noting that when anatomical terms have a different meaning in the dental clinical setting than in textbooks, this “discrepancy can lead to confusion and miscommunication among dental professionals, especially for those who are just starting their education”); Joan Dentler, 5 Inconsistent Terminologies That Hurt Health Care, American Hospital Association Trustee Services, https://trustees.aha.org/articles/985-words-matter-in-health-care (last visited Mar. 5, 2025) (noting that “[o]ne of the most dangerous” challenges for hospitals and health systems is “inconsistent terminology”); Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Inconsistent Terminology, at 2, https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/641361/dl?inline#:~:text=Statement of the Issue,particular discipline and across disciplines (last visited Mar. 5, 2025) (explaining that “[i]nconsistent terminology can lead to miscommunication” in the context of forensic science); Ewelina Smoktunowicz, Azy Barak, Gerhard Andersson, Rosa M Banos, Thomas Berger, Cristina Botella, Blake F. Dear, Tara Donker, David D. Ebert, Heather Hadjistavropoulos, David C. Hodgins, Viktor Kaldo, David C. Mohr, Tine Nordgreen, Mark B Powers, Heleen Riper, Lee M. Ritterband, Alexander Rozental, Stephen M Schueller, Nickolai Titov, Cornelia Weise & Per Carlbring, Consensus Statement on the Problem of Terminology in Psychological Interventions Using the Internet or Digital Components, 21 Internet Interventions 1, 4 (2020) (explaining how “[t]erminology inconsistency leads to miscommunication” in the context of internet-delivered psychological interventions); Sylvia A. Ward, The Hierarchical Terminology Technique: A Method to Address Terminology Inconsistency, 46 Quality & Quantity 71, 71 (2012) (describing the “negative impact” of “inconsistent terminology” on “effective communication” in the computer-supported cooperative work context); Regina Walsh, A Response to Eight Views on Terminology: Is It Possible to Tame the Wild Beast of Inconsistency, 7 Advances in Speech-Language Pathology 105, 105 (2005) (discussing the “challenge” of “inconsistent” terminology in speech pathology).

See, e.g., Kedia, supra note 12, at 164 (noting that “legal writing courses provide a forum to teach explicitly what doctrinal courses teach implicitly—legal analysis and reasoning”).

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.

See supra note 126 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 9; Brown, supra note 8, at 94, 97; Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 110; Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 369; Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 95; Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 165; Oates et al., supra note 17, at 53; Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 121.

See, e.g., Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 92, 119; Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 118; Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137.

See Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 123, 126–28, 143, 189–90, 192.

See supra notes 106–113 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 188–92, 219, 222–24, 293–96; Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 48, 50, 70, 144, 255–56, 301, 323, 328.

That PowerPoint slide might look like this example:

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 8, at 96 n.1, 113 n.1 (noting that some professors might use “different terminology” for the rule support section, such as “case explanation” or “case illustration”); Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 145, 173 n.8, 286, 302 n.7 (explaining that other professors may use the terms “rule proof and explanation,” “rule explanation,” and “explanation or proof of the rule”); Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 40 (including a chart comparing different variations of the IRAC paradigm, some of which use the term rule explanation); Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 94–95 (including different variations of the IRAC paradigm that use either rule explanation or rule proof).

See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.

See Coughlin et al., supra note 10, at 402.

See, e.g., id. at 7, 87–88, 95, 100, 113–32, 136, 153, 176–77, 261, 266–67, 281, 295, 324, 326, 338, 357–59, 380, 386–87, 393–95, 404, 411.

Id. at 94 (using “explanation of the rules,” not rule explanation).

Id. at 95.

Dernbach et al., supra note 8, at 219 n.1 (describing different potential acronyms for the legal writing structure, including the CREAC structure with its “explanation”); see also id. at 185, 189–92, 219, 293–94 (generally using the term “explanation” but not as a term of art to describe the rule support section).

See Calleros & Holst, supra note 8, at 183, 187, 194, 196, 231–33, 254–59, 291–93, 416, 493 (using different terms for rule support cases when labeling examples and in the text, including “[s]pecific case analysis,” “[i]n-depth analysis of case law,” “[i]n-depth case analysis,” “[c]ase analysis,” “[i]n-depth analysis,” “[i]n-depth analysis of favorable case law,” and “[i]n-depth analysis of adverse case law”).

Id. at 186 (using the term “[p]recedent” in a sample outline to label rule support section).

See, e.g., id. at 145, 173 n.8, 286, 302 n.7 (using “explanation or proof of the rule” in addition to rule explanation) (emphasis omitted).

See, e.g., id. at 151–53.

Id. at 173 n.8, 302 n.7 (stating “rule proof and explanation” in addition to rule proof).

See, e.g., Neumann et al., supra note 10, at 117, 173–74, 179.

See, e.g., id. at 117–18, 120–21, 125–28, 136, 143–47, 265, 278, 364, 406 (using “proof of rule” and “rule proof and explanation” in addition to rule proof). The authors note that this section is called “rule proof and explanation or simply rule proof.” Id. at 143 (emphasis added).

See, e.g., Slocum & Nerger, supra note 31, at 141, 147, 149, 153–54, 168–70, 172, 193–203, 241–42, 247, 289–91, 318, 325, 328, 385–86, 392, 403, 549–50.

See, e.g., Neumann et al., supra note 30, at 137–41, 145–47, 150–51, 154, 159–60, 162, 208, 212, 257, 267, 290, 311.

Edwards & Moppett, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra note 30, at 92 (using term as a component of rule explanation).

See, e.g., id. at 89–90, 92–93, 95–97, 99, 101–02, 105, 109, 113–15, 119, 132, 140, 197, 198, 213.

Id. at 92 (using term as a component of rule explanation).

Murray & DeSanctis, supra note 10, at 22, 29, 30, 116, 119–25, 133–34, 136–39, 144–60, 165–68, 183–84, 186–89, 193–201, 203, 209–10, 217, 247, 253–54, 261, 265, 267, 275, 354–57, 369, 382, 389.

See, e.g., Schultz & Sirico, supra note 31, at 48 (introducing the IRAC structure as only including the issue, rule, application/analysis, and conclusion without mentioning the rule support section); see also id. at 50 (labeling the rule support section of an example IRAC as only “Major Premise: (Relevant legal authority or rule)”).

See id. at 47 (introducing the concept of precedents as “earlier cases . . . whose holdings determine the outcome of later cases” but not using the term as a proxy for rule support cases).

Beazley & Smith, supra note 10, at 9, 46, 48, 128, 134–35, 140–44, 146, 150–52, 154, 164, 169, 172–75, 178, 181–82, 186, 188–89, 232–33, 238, 240–42, 251, 259, 284–85.

See, e.g., Edwards & Moppett, Process, Analysis, and Organization, supra note 30, at 95–96, 100–01, 104, 107, 111, 257, 263–64, 268.

See, e.g., id. at 77, 79–81, 83–84, 88, 90–91, 103, 108, 111–12, 116–20, 257–59, 263, 293; see also id. at 77 n.1, 79 n.6 (describing the components of the CREAC acronym, including just the “Explanation”).

See Chew & Pryal, supra note 8, at 369, 465 (using term once in text and once in glossary).

See id. at 40.

See, e.g., id. at 360–61, 369–77, 429, 465, 478.

See, e.g., Oates et al., supra note 17, at 9, 30, 53–54, 104, 117–19, 122, 134, 136–38, 169–70, 173, 185–86, 191–93, 195, 198–99, 202–04, 206–07, 209–10, 223, 238, 240, 245–47, 249, 251, 253, 271–73, 278, 351–53, 357–58, 361–62, 384, 397, 491–93, 497, 499, 503–05, 510–11, 579–80, 585, 593, 611, 614, 655, 671, 739, 879, 932.

Id. at 209 (describing the CREAC structure, including the “[e]xplanation of the rules”).

Brown, supra note 8, at 265.

Id. at 96 n.1, 113 n.1 (noting that some professors might use “different terminology” for the rule support section, such as case explanation); see also id. at 360.

Id. at 96 n.1, 113 n.1 (noting that some professors might use “different terminology” for the rule support section, such as case illustration); see also id. at 332, 360, 363.

Id. at 75–77, 97–98, 114, 116, 118–20, 122–23, 148–49, 151, 155, 202–03, 360–61, 368, 416, 429, 464 (using the term to describe part of the rule support section, not the entire section).

See, e.g., id. at 6, 93 n.1, 93–101, 105, 113–16, 118–23, 125–27, 140–43, 146, 148, 150, 153–56, 161–62, 164–67, 194, 202–03, 223, 240, 266, 276, 278, 280, 330, 332, 344, 346, 351, 358–67, 369–75, 390, 397, 399, 406–07, 409–11, 415–16, 419, 426–29, 435, 437–39, 442–43, 456, 526, 528.

See, e.g., Shapo et al., supra note 8, at 121–22, 125, 131–32, 135–37, 139, 172, 179, 228–29, 357–58, 406, 415–16, 418; see also id. at 138 (labeling sample IRAC or IRAC outline with, among other things, “[c]ases,” “[d]istinguishing [u]nfavorable case,” and “[f]avorable [c]ase”); id. at 180 (labeling outline of IRAC with “[c]ases”).